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UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO EFT
INFORMATION: WHO SHOULD BE
RESPONSIBLE?
Public concern over computer crime has skyrocketed in the last
few years as the public has come to realize the tremendous potential for
large-scale computer abuse. This concern, however, has been concentrated in the area of unauthorized transfers of funds-namely, theft.
This is illustrated by the recent legislation enacted in response to such
crime.' It is only recently that people have become aware of the potential threats to privacy raised by the ability of computers to accumulate
and aggregate vast amounts of information and almost instantaneously
record and extract that data.
This Note is concerned with the computer systems used by financial institutions to handle financial transactions--electronic funds transfer (EFT) systems. Virtually no federal legislation is currently in effect
which sets forth the liabilities associated with unauthorized access to information in EFT systems. The purpose of this Note is to propose legislation which would hold financial institutions strictly liable to the
consumer for all damages caused by unauthorized access to financial
and/or personal information contained within EFT systems.
I.

THE PRIVACY PROBLEM
A.

WHAT is AN EFT?

Electronic fund transfer is defined in the federal code 2 as "[a]ny
transfer of funds, other than a transaction originated by check, draft, or
similar paper instrument, which is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic instrument, or computer or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to debit or credit an
account. ''3 In simpler terms, EFT is merely "a process of value ex'4
change achieved through the use of electronic devices."
1. See, e.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1982); Electronic
Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693a-1693r (1982); 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.14 (1983).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693a-1693r (1982).
3. Id. § 1693a(6).
4. Katskee & Wright, An Overview of the Legal Issues Confronting the Establish-

ment of Electronic Funds Transfer Services, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 7 (1980).
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Although the concept of EFTs is relatively new, it already plays a
significant role in financial transactions. As early as 1975, close to 76%
of the almost forty-six trillion dollars of payments were handled by
such systems.'
B.

BENEFITS OF EFT SYSTEMS

Financial institutions derive many benefits from EFT systems. The
technology involved has greatly reduced the costs associated with gathering and processing financial information,6 eliminating the need to
physically transport, sort and store paper messages. 7 Also, the immediacy of access provided by EFTs greatly increases the value of such systems to financial institutions. Savings have been estimated at thirty to
forty percent over the traditional system.8 In addition to transaction
cost savings, EFT systems offer financial institutions the flexibility to
move and expand their facilities in response to population growth and
movement without incurring the traditional costs associated with opening and moving bank branches. 9
The consumer has also benefitted greatly from EFT systems.
These systems provide consumers with faster access to funds and other
banking services at more times and at more places than does the traditional system. The cost savings to financial institutions, mentioned
above, will in all likelihood be passed on to the consumer in the form of
additional and more economic financial services.
In addition to financial institutions and individual consumers, the
public in general will benefit from a more efficient market system and
the prospects of additional technology in this area.
C.

THE PRIVACY PROBLEMS OF EFT SYSTEMS

The problems that arise from EFT transactions are caused by the
informational nature of the system. EFT operates as a substitute for
cash. The elimination of the tangible element of cash transactions results in a financial system composed of information transfers.' 0
"[A]lthough a bank's tangible assets are an obvious lure for the crimi5. Comment, The Emergence of the Electronic Fund Transfer System: Consumer
Protection, Federal Antitrust, and Branch Banking Laws, 10 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 323, 325

(1983).
6. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SELECTED ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER IS-

SUES, PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND EQUITY, BACKGROUND PAPER (1982) (hereinafter cited as
BACKGROUND PAPER).
7. Comment, supra note 5, at 324.

8. Pierce, The Competitive Implications of EFT, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 133, 136 (1980).
9. Id.
10. Brown, Implications of the InformationalNature of Payments, 2 COMPUTER L.J.

153, 157 (1980).
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over, the value of those intangible assets is much greater than just the
value of the funds.1 2 Thus, the problems arising from EFT systems are
essentially information management problems.
EFT systems create privacy concerns because "(1) they create permanent records of transactions, which heretofore may not have generated such records, and (2) they pose information management
problems through the increased centralization of data, and the improved capture and retrieval capabilities inherent in their technologies." 13 These differences between the manual and EFT systems have
prompted financial institutions to realize that their use of EFT systems
places upon them the responsibility to protect consumers from unau-4
thorized transactions than does their use of the traditional system.'
This increased protection is especially necessary due to the fact that financial institutions are privy to more private information than almost
5
any other type of business.'
The continued existence of EFT systems is dependent upon public
acceptance. 16 Because EFT systems have tremendous capacity to aggregate widely dispersed pieces of information, privacy for the users of
such systems has become a matter of public concern. 1 7 The public
wants assurance that the information accumulated within EFT systems
will be used only for purposes related to the accomplishment of particular transactions of the customers' choosing.18 Thus, maintaining the integrity of EFT systems is a major concern. "[A]n unacceptable number
of security failures could undermine public confidence in financial institutions, thus weakening the national economy and ultimately the na19
tional security."'
To preserve the integrity of EFT systems and, hence, continue to
derive the benefits from those systems, the consumer's right to privacy
must be protected. In this type of payment system, privacy is violated
when information is accessed without the consumer's consent and is
made available to and used by those who are not parties to the payment
transaction for purposes unrelated to the transaction. 20 Thus, "[o]ne
11. Augenblick, Is Your Bank Bugged?, BANKERS MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 44.
12. BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 6, at 45.
13. Brown, supra note 10, at 160.
14. Winter, Banking By Blip: Advent of the Checkless Society Raises Legal Questions,
69 A.B.A.J. 263, 264 (1983).
15. Augenblick, supra note 11, at 44.
16. Comment, supra note 5, at 323.
17. BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 6, at 53.
18. Id. at 53.
19. Id. at 46.
20. Id. at 31.
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way in which privacy can be violated is by illegal or unauthorized access
21
to EFT and other telecommunication systems."1
As the use of EFTs increases, the methods for gaining unauthorized
access to personal information also increases. 22 Access to EFT systems
can occur in a variety of ways. The more common of these are:
(1) Electromagnetic pickups-intercepting the radiation generated by
a computer's central processor, or telphone-teleprinter lines; (2) browsing-connecting an unauthorized terminal into an EDP system;
(3) piggy-back entry-intercepting communications between legal
users; (4) wire-tapping-tapping the systems telephone-teleprinter
lines.

23

Access to EFT systems is presently not very difficult. With several
hundred dollars of equipment, a knowledgeable technician can wiretap
telephone links to automated teller machines. 24 Invasion of privacy in
such a case does not require the work of an expert.
The procedures currently being followed by financial institutions to
protect privacy is extremely inadequate. 25 Based on a 1979 survey of 130
of the 300 largest commercial banks in the United States, 26 seventy-six
percent of the banks that responded to the survey admitted that they do
not ask their customers' permission before disseminating private information to third parties, nor do they inform their customers about the
possibility of this being done. The survey also indicated that eighty-two
percent of the banks always obtained additional information about their
customers from outside sources and only thirty percent tell their customers the type of information that will be collected. Although this
survey was not concerned with safeguards on EFT systems, it is indicative of the relaxed attitude of financial institutions toward the protection of private information. This survey also indicates that the banks do
not provide as much protection of records as the public generally be27
lieves that they do.

D. DAMAGES
The damages that could result from such invasion of privacy are
numerous. One of the most obvious is the mental anguish and/or distress suffered by customers due to the use of personal information for
21. Id. at 30.

22. Greguras, EFT and Privacy, 26 SECURITY
23.
24.
25.
26.

MGMT.,

June 1982 at 24, 27.

Bequai, Legal Liabilities of EFT Systems, MAG. BANK AD., Jan. 1983, at 25, 25-26.
Dentzer & Cook, Tapping the Banks Wires, NEWSWEEK, April 25, 1983, at 58.
BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 6, at 34.
D. LINOWES, A RESEARCH STUDY OF PRIVACY AND BANKING (1979) (University of

Illinois). Of the banks surveyed, only 26% responded. Thus, the results are not absolute
but are indicative of the privacy problems.
27. BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 6, at 34.
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unauthorized purposes. 28 The possibilities for injury in this type of situation are limited only by the imagination.
In addition to personal injury, "some bankers worry that, by eavesdropping on EFT lines, snoopers could find out where large sums were
being transferred, tipping them off to impending mergers and other
transactions." 29 Access to such "insider" information could have a significant impact on our market system, severely undermining its integrity and resulting in the collapse of the free market system as we know
it today.
II.

CURRENT EFT LEGISLATION

A. THE EFT ACT

AND REGULATION

E

In response to the potential problems raised by the advent of EF
systems, Congress enacted two separate pieces of legislation: the EFT
Act 3° and the Right to Financial Privacy Act. 31 Neither of these Acts
specifically addresses the problem of unauthorized access to information
32
within EFT systems.
The EFT Act, enacted in 1978, was the first piece of EFT legislation. This Act and its later supplement, Regulation E,3 3 address many
of the issues raised by the use of EFT systems. The consumer protection provisions in these laws apply, however, only to unauthorized ac"There is no specific privacy
cess to funds and not to information.
34
protection provision in the EFT Act."
Section 1693h of the EFT Act addresses the liability of financial institutions. 35 This subsection is set forth in pertinent part as follows:
1693h. Liability ofJfinancial institutions
(a) Action or failure to act proximately causing damages
Subject to subsection (b) and (c) of this section, a financial institution shall be liable to a consumer for all damages proximately
caused by(1) the financial institution's failure to make an electronic fund
transfer, in accordance with the terms and conditions of an
28. Bequai, supra note 23, at 27.
29. Dentzer & Cook, supra note 24, at 58.

30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693a-1693r (1982).
31. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1982).
32. Although there have been cases dealing with financial institutions' liabilities with
respect to EFT systems, generally these cases have dealt with the unauthorized transfer
of funds and not access to information. See, e.g., Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d
951 (7th Cir. 1982).

33. 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-.14 (1983).
34. Katskee & Wright, supra note 4, at 24.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1693h (1982).
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account, in the correct amount or in a timely manner when
properly instructed to do so by the consumer, ...
(2) the financial institution's failure to make an electronic
fund transfer due to insufficient funds when the financial institution failed to credit, in accordance with the terms and
conditions of an account, a deposit of funds to the consumer's
account which would have provided sufficient funds to make
the transfer, and
(3) the financial institution's failure to stop payment of a
pre-authorized transfer from a consumer's account when instructed to do so in accordance with the terms and conditions
of the account.
Acts of God and technical malfunctions
Intent
In the case of a failure described in subsection (a) of this section
which was not intentional and which resulted from a bona fide error, notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably
adapted to avoid any such error, the financial institution shall be
36
liable for actual damages proved.
B.

THE RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT

The Right to Financial Privacy Act 37 was also enacted in 1978. This
Act is quite narrow and applies only to customers' rights and the federal government's duties in regard to obtaining records on customers
maintained by financial institutions.38 This Act does not cover disclosure of information to state and local governments or to private institutions. 39 Nor does this Act cover access to information by individuals.
C.

THE FEDERAL WIRE FRAUD ACT

In addition to the two Acts above, which relate specifically to EFT
systems, liability for unauthorized access to EFT systems can be imposed under the Federal Wire Fraud Act. 40 This Act imposes liability on
persons who commit fraud by means of wire, radio, or television communication. To be held liable under this Act, a person must make a
transmission of writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds. Thus, this
Act does not cover unauthorized access to information without some additional transmission.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1982).
Katskee & Wright, supra note 4, at 24.
BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 6, at 36.
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
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STATE STATUTES

It is apparent that some legislation is necessary to set forth the liabilities for unauthorized access to information maintained within EFT
systems. Several states have enacted their own statutes which include
privacy protection provisions.
1.

41

Kentucky

Kentucky is one of the few states which has enacted statutes making it a crime to intercept, tap, or alter electronic information between
an automated banking device and the issuer. 42 These statutes hold the
accessor liable for unauthorized access to EFT information, but these
statutes have no provision for holding the financial institution liable,
even if the information is obtained as a result of the financial institution's failure to properly protect it.
2.

Montana

Montana has enacted its own EFT Act 43 because its legislature felt
that there was no adequate federal or state regulation to control the development of the new EFT technology. 44 Montana's EFT Act regulates
unauthorized disclosure of EF records, but it only applies to a knowing
disclosure of records to persons who have no legal rights to see the
records. Section 32-6-105(1) of the Montana Act provides:
Protection of privacy
(1) No information relating to any transaction by electronic funds
transfer, or application thereof, between a financial institution and its
customers or prospective customer may be disclosed by the financial institutions to any person or government entity without consent of the
customer or, if the customer refused to so consent, under subpoena is45
sued by a court of record.
And section 32-6-106(1) of the Act provides:
Unauthorized disclosure of electronicfunds transferrecords
(1) A person commits the offense of unauthorized disclosure of electronic funds transfer records if he has lawful access to such records by
virtue of office or employment:
(a) and permits another, who lacks lawful access to such records,
to inspect, copy, or read such records; or
(b) transfers such records to another who lacks lawful access
46
thereto.
41. Katskee & Wright, supra note 4, at 25.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Ky. REV. STAT. § 39 (1978).
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 32-6-101 to 32-6-402 (1983).
Id. § 32-6-102.
Id. § 32-6-105(1).
Id. § 32-6-106(1).
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New Mexico

New Mexico has taken a new approach to the problem of privacy
by enacting a Confidentiality Statute 47 which holds the financial institution responsible for failure to provide adequate safeguards against unauthorized access. This statute provides in pertinent part:
A. Every seller of goods or services having a point-of-sale terminal on
its premises and every financial institution contracting for use of
or operating a remote financial service unit shall adopt and maintain safeguards to insure the safety of funds of any third party in
situations where deposits are accepted or cash advances or withdrawals are made and to insure the safety of items and other information, which safeguards precautions consistent with the
appropriate minimum security requirements specified by applicable federal or state law or by federal or state regulatory agencies
having jurisdiction over
such point-of-sale terminal or remote fi48
nancial service unit.
III.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT

Most EFT transactions are controlled by the federal EFT Act.
Although state laws providing greater protection than the EFT Act are
not preempted unless inconsistent,4 9 these laws cannot be relied upon
to solve privacy problems inherent in EFT systems. Because of the security of state laws regarding EFT systems and the diversity in existing
laws, federal legislation is needed to set forth uniform treatment of the
violation of privacy caused by the use of EFTs.
To fill this need, this Note proposes an amendment to section 1693h
of the federal EFT Act, which was set forth in pertinent part at section
II A, above. This proposed amendment provides a civil remedy by adding a fourth subsection to section 1693h(a) of the EFT Act. Section
1693h(a)(4) would read as follows:
§ 1693h. Liability of Financial Institutions
(a) Action or failure to act proximately causing damages. Subject to
subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a financial institution shall
be liable to a consumer for all damages proximately caused by(4) the financial institution's failure to prevent unauthorized
access to consumer information contained in the electronicfund
transfer system.

Under this proposal, a financial institution would be strictly liable
for all unauthorized access to consumer information in its EFT systems,
subject to proof of actual damages suffered by the consumer.
47. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-16-12 (1978).
48. Id. § 58-16-12A.
49. Comment, supra note 5, at 337.

1985

UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO EFT INFORMATION
IV.
A.

179

JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT
SHOULD ANYONE BE RESPONSIBLE FOR UNAUTHORIZED
ACCESS TO EFT SYSTEMS?

It can be argued that legislation holding anyone but the perpetrator
liable for unauthorized access to EFT information is unnecessary. Realistically, any additional costs that a financial institution would incur for
information protection would most likely be passed on to the consumer
who the legislation is intended to protect. Additionally, it may be worth
sacrificing some privacy in order to obtain the benefits provided by EFT
systems. "Generally people accept . .. many acknowledged limitations
on their privacy, not only because they may have no choice, but because
they recognize that they derive substantial benefits thereby. 5 0° In effect, then, one could argue that by using a financial institution with an
EFT system to process financial transactions, one has effectuated a
waiver of all privacy rights connected with those transactions.
We do not need to take this extreme position in order to benefit
from the advanced technology of EFT systems. As long as the benefits
of EFT systems outweigh the costs, including the cost of protecting privacy, we will still benefit from their use. If financial institutions have
the necessary cost/benefit information, the most economical and socially acceptable solution can be reached. However, when weighing the
benefits of EFTs against the costs of protecting privacy, the costs of not
protecting privacy should be considered as well.
B.

WHY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO EFT SYSTEMS.

Financial institutions should be liable for damages that are caused
by their failure to adequately safeguard the confidentiality of the information contained within their EFT systems. Financial institutions are
in the best position to protect informational privacy because they have
physical control over the system and are usually the most knowledgeable about systems in general. Because of the potential for liability, financial institutions would spend mor4 resources on security systems. If
existing security systems were not adequate, financial institutions
would be motivated to invest in research and development to produce
adequate security systems.
The perpetrators of EFT crimes are often employees of the financial institution. 51 If the financial institution is held liable for all such
crimes, then the institution would find it economically efficient to implement extensive internal control procedures to prevent insider abuse.
50. BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 6, at 31.

51. Id. at 48.
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Financial institutions can take many precautions to protect themselves against liability. A few such precautions are: education and training of personnel, legal awareness, physical and software security, and
communication security.5 2 In fact, most legal problems related to EFT
systems are "both within the control and ability of financial institutions
'5 3
to avoid or limit.
One of the best methods of protecting the privacy of EFT information is encryption. 54 This is a process which transforms information
contained within an EFT system into a code which is very difficult to
decipher. Encryption often makes accessing the information not worth
the trouble required to decipher the code. 55 The most widely used encryption formula is the United States Government's Data Encryption
Standard. 56 Financial institutions have been reluctant to use it, however, because of the additional cost of installing it in automated teller
machines. 57 With the incentives that additional liability would create,
financial institutions may find it economically feasible to use such a protective device.
The American Bar Association has recommended that financial institutions use a "message authentication standard" which would enable
58
the institution to know when a communication line has been tapped.
Another suggestion is forbidding existence of the information in
59
human-readable form.
The most persuasive argument for holding financial institutions liable for maintaining the privacy of the information that they control is
that a financial institution will be able to fully evaluate the balance between the advantages of EFT systems and the related costs. The financial institution should be willing to spend on EFT system security an
amount up to and including the amount of potential liability. If this
amount exceeds the additional benefits derived from the use of EFT
systems over the traditional system, then EFT systems would not be
cost effective and probably would be discontinued.
Under current law, most financial institutions are unwilling to
spend on security amounts exceeding their potential liability for unauthorized transfers of funds. Very little economic consideration is given
to the costs related to the loss of privacy caused by unauthorized access
to EFT information. Thus, the day-to-day decisions made by financial
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Bequai, supra note 23, at 26.
Id. at 25.
BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 6, at 51.
Id.
Dentzer & Cook, supra note 24, at 58.
Id.
Id.
BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 6, at 51.
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institutions regarding EFT security are based on only part of the necessary information. Considering the emphasis put on personal privacy in
the United States and the tremendous possibilities of personal and economic damage that could occur, the result of this decision making is
absurd.
If financial institutions are not held liable for unauthorized access
to EFT information, then the only person who could be held liable
would be the perpetrator who actually accessed the information. This
would present many problems. First of all, very few people ever get
caught for committing computer crimes. 60 The method of access and
the nature of the item "stolen" makes it virtually impossible to catch
computer criminals. With EFT systems, several people can simultaneously gain access to the system and "steal" information undetected.
There are, however, devices which financial institutions can use which
will alert them when an outsider has tapped their lines.6 1 Therefore,
because only financial institutions have any real chance to catch computer criminals, the injured party would have no other means of reimbursement if financial institutions were not held liable.
Second, and most importantly, is the above-mentioned cost-benefit
analysis which financial institutions should undertake when installing
and maintaining EFT systems. If only the perpetrator is responsible,
the financial institution need not consider any of the costs related to information disclosure. Such a failure to consider the full range of costs
would result in a skewed analysis of the costs and benefits of EFT systems and may not result in the most economical solution.
Holding financial institutions personally responsible for information protection eliminates much of the need for government involvement in the control of computerized financial information. Avoiding
government inducement not only benefits the public through reduced
taxes, but also accords with most people's desire for less government intrusion in personal affairs. Many people fear that government controlled access to information would result in the type of society
predicted by George Orwell in his book, 1984.62 Under the solution proposed by this Note, the financial institution itself would analyze the
costs and benefits of EFT systems and would appropriately control access to information.
60. Dunn, A Bug on the Wire Could Cost You Plenty, Bus. WK., March 28, 1983, at
127.
61. Dentzer & Cook, supra note 24, at 58.
62. Computerized Bank Accounts, Credit Cards, and George Orwell's "1984", 32 COMPUTERS & PEOPLE, Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 27.
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STRICT LIABILITY

The liability of financial institutions for unauthorized access to EFT
information should be determined by a strict liability standard as opposed to a negligence standard. Although the courts have been reluctant to extend strict liability to a business offering a service as opposed
to a product,6 3 the policy reasons justifying imposition of strict liability
are present in the computer industry.64 Also, the fact that computer information and programs can be stolen and duplicated tends to favor
65
their being characterized as a service rather than a product.
Strict liability is generally imposed when a business's activity poses
a danger to society and the policies of loss spreading, accident reduction,
and victim compensation are met.6 6 The dangers to society posed by unauthorized access to private financial and/or personal information maintained within EFT systems are evident from the above discussion of the
67
privacy problems inherent in such systems.
The imposition of strict liability would support a policy of loss
spreading because financial institutions are in a position to either insure
against liability or, more likely, to pass on the cost to the public by increasing the costs of its services. This is fair, since the public also receives cost reductions because of the efficiency of EFT systems.
Under a negligence theory of liability, the consumer would recover
only after proving that the financial institution was negligent in its protection of EFT information. This would be especially difficult if the
amount of damages was not significant. 68 Thus, under such a theory,
many injured consumers would probably be forced to absorb their own
losses, and the policy of loss spreading would not be fulfilled.
Imposing strict liability would also serve the goal of accident reduction. Financial institutions are in the best position to prevent unauthorized access to EFT information. Strict liability provides an incentive for
financial institutions to expend additional resources to protect the information as well as to develop new methods of protection. Under a negligence theory of liability, such incentives are greatly reduced, if not
eliminated. Financial institutions would do only the minimum necessary to protect EFT information and would have very little incentive to
63. W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 99-100 (1979).
64. Comment, Computer Software and Strict Products Liability, 20 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 439, 456 (1982).
65. Id. at 451.
66. Id. at 447; W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 494-95 (4th ed. 1971).
67. See supra notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text.

68. If the court hears only evidence of the individual consumer's damages and those
damages are not significant relative to the cost to the financial institution of information
protection, the consumer is not very likely to succeed with a claim against the financial
institution based on a theory of negligence.
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develop new technologies for the protection of privacy. Although eliminating all possibility of unauthorized access to EFT systems may not be
economically feasible, providing incentives to reduce those possibilities
is a legitimate goal.
The victims of unauthorized accesses to EFT information would be
compensated more often for their damages under a strict liability theory. As mentioned above, the victim has a much better chance of obtaining relief under strict liability than under a negligence theory.
Since the financial institution is in a better position to bear the burden
of the risk of unauthorized access to EFT information, the goals implicit
in a strict liability system are achieved. Also, internalizing all of the
costs and benefits of EFT systems encourages an efficient level of investment by financial institutions in privacy protection.
D.

CAUSATION

Under a strict liability theory, the consumer would still have to
prove that his damages were a result of his private financial and/or personal information being accessed from the financial institution's EFT
system. In other words, the consumer would have to prove that the financial institution's failure to maintain the privacy of the information
caused it to be accessed without authorization. Proving this may be a
problem when such information is readily available from other sources.
The law's major concern, however, is that of maintaining the privacy of
truly private and/or personal information which by its very nature
would not be readily available from many other sources. Although
problems of proving causation may prevent some consumers from recovering from financial institutions for breaches of privacy, this should
not be used to justify a rule preventing all consumers from recovering
from financial institutions for privacy invasions.
What may well be cause for greater concern is that much information may be accessed from EFT systems without the knowledge of the
consumer. In this case, although a wrong has been committed, the proposal presented in this Note would provide no cause of action against
the financial institution, since such a wrong would probably occur most
often against individual consumers and involve smaller financial transactions, while most cases arising under the proposed amendment would
probably concern large financial transactions by large entities. Still,
since the financial institution would attempt to protect itself from these
suits by providing adequate safeguards against privacy invasion, the proposed amendment would benefit both the individual consumer and the
large corporate entity.
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DAMAGES

Once causation has been established, the consumer must also prove
damages in order to recover from the financial institution. Under this
proposal, the amount of damages that can be claimed by the consumer
is the "actual damages proved." In the case of stolen funds, actual damages would be easy to prove, as they would equal the amount of the
funds stolen. But how are damages measured when the harm is the
prevention of a corporate takeover or merger? In addition, what is the
measure of damage resulting from public exposure of personal information? These losses are very difficult to quantify. This difficulty, however, is no reason to deny the consumer recovery.
In other areas of the law, we accept the necessity of placing values
on things which are virtually impossible to value. Values have been put
on pain and suffering, mental anguish, lost mobility, and even human
life. The difficulties involved in determining these values have not kept
us from attempting, to the best of our ability, to compensate those who
have been harmed.
This proposal requires that the consumer set forth facts sufficient
to establish to the court's satisfaction a particular amount of damages.
Although this may often be difficult, it is not an insurmountable
burden.
An additional problem that may undercut the effectiveness of this
proposal is the feasibility of instigating actions for unauthorized access
to EFT information. In cases where the amount of damages is insignificant or difficult to prove, it may not be worth the time and money necessary to file a claim against the financial institution. 69 Most cases in
this area would probably involve only large entities and/or large transactions; but, as mentioned above, the work done by the financial institutions to protect themselves from those suits would benefit all the
consumers.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is time that we look closely at all of the costs and benefits associated with the new technology of EFT systems. This technology has provided us with significant reductions in financial transaction costs and
has generally improved our standard of living. It is apparent that EFT
systems are here to stay. These benefits cannot be fully evaluated without also considering the associated costs-specifically, the increased
likelihood of privacy invasion through such systems.
This proposal suggests an amendment to existing legislation that
69. A similar problem has arisen under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
relating to the ability to obtain a remedy for bad checks.
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would impose liability on financial institutions for unauthorized access
to EFT information in a manner which would minimize the need for
government intervention and encourage the most economical solution
to such problem of keeping information private. The importance of the
privacy of personal and financial information in the United States mandates the adoption of such a proposal.
Leslie Susan Norman

